Van Gogh wrote that it was possible for him to make an especially expressive picture, or as he put it, something with "feeling" in it, because the picture had already spontaneously taken form in his mind before he started drawing. He added, however, that if there was something worthwhile in the picture, this was "not by accident but because of real intention and purpose."
1 Reflection on such testimony and on his own experience as a poet led Paul Valéry to conclude that artistic creation always involves a combination of "conscious acts" and "spontaneous formation"; only their relative proportion varies. 2 If this point is granted, the outstanding and notoriously difficult problem is to understand how such different elements combine in the creative process. In other words, how is inspiration, or the work of the muse, related to the artist's deliberations, plans, rational choices, and intentional actions? In what follows I shall develop a conjecture that falls within the conceptual space defined by two extreme theses--the popular, inspirationist idea that artistic creativity is a sudden, involuntary, and ultimately inexplicable event, and the dubious, rationalistic counterthesis, which characterizes artistic creation as a principled, deliberate selection from amongst an array of previously known options, each of which is associated with an expected quantity of artistic value. In my first section I discuss Henri Poincaré's reflections on creativity in his 1908 essay, "L'Invention mathématique." 3 Although some of Poincaré's ideas have been restated and elaborated upon in the literature on creativity, I contend that his most important claims still merit a closer look. Taking Poincairé's general model as my point of departure, I sketch a new conjecture about artistic creativity in section 2; I also discuss a kindred proposal by Jon Elster. In section 3 I further illustrate and explain this conjecture with reference to Virginia Woolf's artistic breakthrough in the writing of Jacob's Room. In my final section I take up and respond to objections that may be raised against these claims about artistic creativity.
Poincaré on Creativity
Poincaré famously reported that some of his best mathematical ideas simply popped into his head while he was on holiday and not consciously doing mathematics:
I then began to study arithmetical questions, apparently without any great result, and without suspecting that they could have the least connection with my previous investigations. Disgusted by my lack of success, I went away to spend a few days at the seaside, and thought about entirely different things. One day, as I was walking along the edge of the cliff, the idea came to me, again with the same characteristics of brevity, suddenness, and immediate certainty, that arithmetical 3 transformations of indefinite ternary quadratic forms are identical with those of non-Euclidian geometry (p. 52).
Poincaré goes on to say that after a stint of hard work on these functions, he encountered new obstacles. His narrative continues:
Thereupon I left for Mont-Valérien, where I had to serve my time in the army, and so my mind was preoccupied with very different matters. One day, as I was crossing the street, the solution of the difficulty which had brought me to a standstill came to me all at once. I did not try to fathom it immediately, and it was only after my service was finished that I returned to the question. I had all the elements, and had only to assemble and arrange them. Accordingly I composed my definitive treatise at a sitting and without any difficulty (p. 53).
At first glance, Poincaré may seem to be espousing an inspirationist conception of creativity--the idea that genuine creativity is largely if not entirely described. Yet Poincaré gives other reasons why inspiration must be accompanied by conscious effort: unless the researcher or artist makes a prior selection of the elements upon which the mind is to operate, the search
will be too open-ended and will most likely be fruitless as a result. Conscious, voluntary work posterior to moments of inspiration is necessary because the ideas that pop into one's mind usually require some development and polishing. Also, it is necessary to verify them: although inspiration tends to be accompanied by a second-order attitude, a belief or feeling, to the effect that the inspired thoughts are correct, worthwhile, or otherwise appropriate, sometimes this feeling of "absolute certainty" is belied by subsequent examination or critical reflection.
To sum up, the moments of idleness or "incubation," when the artistic or scientist has set aside his or her work and takes up some unrelated pastime, can be crucial to the creative process. Yet if the thinker is at such times "idle" in the sense of not being consciously occupied by work, in fact the mind is not at all idle in the sense of being useless, empty, or unoccupied, for in fact an "unconscious machine" has been set in motion and is hard at work.
Or to shift to another image employed by Poincaré, one wheel on the pulley is idle so that the other wheels can work all the more efficiently.
One of the most original and fascinating aspects of Poincaré's discussion of creativity is his attempt to say something about how the process of incubation works, and more specifically, about how this process is functionally related to the efforts of the conscious ego or self. Poincaré repeatedly insists that the key to mathematical innovation, be it conscious or unconscious, cannot simply be the application of "a tremendous power of attention" or of a heightened capacity of calculation. The symbolic combinations to be searched through are simply too numerous for this to be the key to discovery. The possible permutations are in principle infinite, and even if the unconscious mind has generative capacities that far exceed those of conscious attention or reasoning, its superior success cannot be explained in these terms: "Invention consists precisely in not constructing useless combinations, but in constructing those that are useful, which are a tiny minority. To invent is to discern, to choose (p. 48)."
Should this point be granted, and if it is further allowed that some unconscious mental process is at times highly successful at realizing the relevant sort of discernment, it would seem to follow that the unconscious ego must employ tact and discernment so as to achieve a kind of selection or that strikes the senses. Instead, the talented mathematician has a sensibility attuned to the "more intimate" beauty which arises from the harmonious order of the parts of some whole, and which pure intelligence can grasp independently of sensorial perception. Elegance, he tells us, is a matter of the harmony between the parts; it is symmetry, a "happy adjustment," order, unity. 7 With this in mind, Poincaré explicitly rules out the "garish colours and the blatant noise of the drum," which he castigated as the preferred objects of the "barbarian" sensibility (p. 17).
Poincaré surmises that while one unconscious mental process blindly generates combinations, the aesthetic sensibility scans the results, singling out those that are especially pleasing, elegant, harmonious, or wellproportioned. In other words, when he was strolling idly along the cliff,
Poincaré was not aware of the unconscious search going on in his unconscious mind, yet part of his mind--the mathematician's aesthetic 8 sensibility--continued to monitor the ongoing calculations, and recognizing an especially harmonious or beautiful result, signalled this to the conscious ego, which thereby enjoyed the experience of inspiration. With these assumptions in place, Poincaré seeks to explain the advent of the occasional false inspiration. What he wants to say in this regard is that while all good mathematical ideas are beautiful, most, but not all beautiful ones are good.
That some of the "poppings" do not turn out to be true or useful meshes with the thought that false ideas can have features, such as elegance, that please the aesthetic sensibility sufficiently to call attention to themselves. Usually, however, unconsciously generated combinations that have the requisite aesthetic virtue to win recognition and pop into awareness turn out to have whatever other epistemic merits qualify them as genuine discoveries.
Poincaré concludes, then, that the talented mathematician's special aesthetic sensibility "plays the part of a delicate sieve" (p. 59), singling out the elegant new combinations. Conscious deliberation must then take up the problem of deciding which products of the inspiration can be worked up into genuine discoveries and which cannot.
The adequacy of Poincaré's scheme to mathematical discovery is not my topic here. I shall instead focus in the next section on ways in which his basic conjecture might be adapted to account for some paradigmatic instances of artistic creativity.
Artistic Creation and Aesthetic Commitments
There is ample evidence supporting the idea that artistic creativity often arises from a multi-faceted process involving hard, deliberate work, periods of idleness, unconscious cognitive activity, and episodes of inspiration, More generally, we can say, along with Kendall L. Walton, Richard
Wollheim, and others, that the apt appreciation of a work of art's valenced, aesthetic qualities requires scrutiny of the work against a background constituted by art forms, conventions, a level and history of achievement, recognition of the aims and standards to which the artist is committed, and a sensibility appropriately attuned to the latter. These are, I believe, relatively uncontroversial points about the determination and recognition of aesthetic and artistic qualities. The conclusion that has not been drawn in the literature is that these contextualist assumptions about the appreciation of aesthetic qualities have important implications for our understanding of artistic creation-a thought that follows from the observation that one of the artist's crucial tasks is the appreciation of his or her own emerging results.
As Poincaré conjectures, inspiration is not only the result of a generative or combinatorial device, but also requires a selective, that is, an appreciative or evaluative, component. As Poincaré also remarked, conscious work on a specific project is necessary to set the unconscious machine in motion, initiating its process of rapidly combining motifs or ideas.
Yet it may also be conjectured that the function of prior, deliberate planning and work is not limited to the mere release or discharge of some generalized, unfocused unconscious activity, which would then be followed by the selective process guided by a universal, formal aesthetic intuition. Instead, an artist's deliberations and intentional efforts help to establish a scheme that provides crucial guidance to subsequent activities that include deliberate experimentation with an artistic medium as well as unconscious or spontaneous explorations and responses that may extend through periods of apparent idleness or incubation.
What I have in mind in speaking of the artist's prior commitment to a scheme is the at least provisional choice of, and engagement with a given medium, art form, genre, and some more particular project. Some such constraints are inherent in a specific technology or craft; others may be proposed or imposed by a patron or producer, while others are more independently arrived at by the individual artist, or group of collaborating artists. Artistic movements and manifestos often reflect and influence this kind of commitment, as do projects whereby an artist undertakes to produce a series of inter-related works meant to fit together in certain valued ways.
Another salient type of scheme to which an artist or group of artists may become committed is an "aesthetic," where an aesthetic is not a doctrine or theory, but a cluster of norms, expectations, and discriminations pertaining to artistic projects.
In The importance of this function of prior constraints can be highlighted by reference to empirical investigations indicating that prompt and frequent self-evaluation is strongly correlated with artistic expertise. 13 A good artist, it would seem, is not only someone who has the gift of unconsciously generating new combinations and skilfully manipulating some medium, but someone who has the propensity to react sensitively to his or her own results, selecting those that correspond to a scheme of artistic value. Here is another point on which Poincaré's conjecture should be acknowledged as the source for contemporary observations about creativy; for example, a key refrain in criticism of algorithmic modelling of creative practices is that such models cannot perform the evaluative function that is essential to genuine creativity. 14 Poincaré reasoned that a period of incubation or idleness can contribute to creativity because it involves a kind of chaotic, unconscious cognitive search. Although there is broad agreement that incubation is often helpful, why this is so remains controversial amongst contemporary psychologists, and some even doubt that a chaotic unconscious search is part of the story. 15 It is hard to see, however, how a complicated new idea can pop into mind in the absence of any search or mental process whatsoever,
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and by definition a period of incubation involves no relevant, conscious effort or deliberate activity. In any case, another hypothesized function of incubation is that of deactivating fruitless assumptions about how a problem can be solved: a period of inactivity makes a fresh look possible, or as the French saying goes, la nuit porte conseil. There is an artistic analogue, at least in cases where the artist deems that his or her results have become too stale and predictable. The choice of new initial constraints, and the corresponding initiation of a period of related, unconscious cognitive activity, can serve to forestall or inhibit reliance upon overworked strategies, of which a tiresome personal mannerism or sterile and repetitive stylistic habit is the most evident symptom. So whatever else it may achieve, settling on a new scheme may help the artist resist a habitual way of working. This is, for example, one of the main motivations of the constraints adopted by members of the influential Dogma '95 movement. 16 My conjecture can be further clarified with reference to a kindred proposal made by Jon Elster, who explores the idea that strategies of rational pre-commitment or resolute choice are crucial to genuine artistic creativity.
He defines 'inspiration' as the rate at which ideas move from the unconscious into the conscious mind, and conjectures that inspiration, thus defined, "is an inversely U-shaped function of the tightness of the constraints." 17 Given this assumption, it makes sense that in a situation where the agent faces too many options, the self-imposition of constraints could be an effective way of enhancing inspiration.
Elster does not advocate any particular explanation as to why "sufficiently" tight constraints contribute to inspiration. One of the themes of his ongoing research on human rationality and irrationality is the idea that precommitments and resolute choices have the characteristic function of allowing agents to overcome anticipated hyperbolic discounting, preference changes, strategic time inconsistency, and surges of passion. Thanks to Circe's helpful advice, Ulysses anticipates that hearing the song of the sirens will cause him to steer his ship to its destruction; so in order to enjoy their lovely song while resisting its fatal call, the hero has himself bound to the mast. More 
Virginia Woolf's Novelistic Breakthrough
In order to flesh out my schematic indications with regard to both the emergence and function of artists' commitments to artistic schemes, in this section I shall briefly discuss a few relevant aspects of a particular episode of successful artistic creativity, namely, Virginia Woolf's composition of her first genuinely modernist novel, Jacob's Room.
After Woolf had published her second novel, Night and Day, in 1919, she was "irritated" (as she put it) by criticisms raised in print by her friend and rival, Katherine Mansfield, who suggested that Woolf's long novel was far too traditional. 18 One reason why Woolf was genuinely bothered by this criticism was that she was basically in agreement with Mansfield and others about the tenets and values associated with modernism in the arts, and had come to understand her own greatest ambition as that of contributing something important to the modernist revolution in literature. 19 developing the unwritten novel there must be a path for me there. 20 Woolf explicitly records here her decision to pursue a scheme for the writing of her next novel, a scheme that is labelled "a new form for a new novel." This scheme receives various other, metaphorical characterizations in the diary entry, including an architectural image. Woolf clearly has in mind a style or narrative "voice" that has emerged here and there in some of her most recent writings. The more proximate "breakthrough" idea, which seems to have crystallized some two weeks after these stylistic experiments, is that of making this sort of "free" narrative form the organizational principle for an entire novel. Thus the artist is simultaneously engaged in a retrospective appreciation of her own earlier efforts, in which she culls what she now perceives as promising moments, and an anticipatory plan for combining those elements so as to generate a result of even greater value in this same vein. In her anticipation of future efforts to apply this scheme, Woolf expresses worries about possible shortcomings of the "path" or approach she has in mind. She knows she will need to find a theme for her new novel, and she worries whether this new form she has in view will truly serve as a vehicle for psychological insights. Woolf's discovery of a general scheme or formal strategy was accompanied by a high level of excitement, and was followed by a burst of deliberate, conscious work, as well as by related, spontaneous and unconscious mental activities. (In Poincaré's terms, the 'unconscious machine' had been set in motion.) Woolf's own manner of talking about this aspect of the writerly process reads as follows:
After a hard day's work, trudging round, seeing all he can, feeling all he can, taking in the book of his mind innumerable notes, the writer becomes-if he can-unconscious. In fact, his under mind works at top speed while his upper mind drowses. Then, after a pause the veil lifts;
and there is the thing-the thing he wants to write about-simplified, composed. 21 In the months that followed her experience of the "gleam of light" about "a new form for a new novel," Woolf made swift progress on Jacob's Room, continuing to monitor her results in terms of the initial scheme and ambition. 22 She recorded in her diary how, when things were going well, she got ideas for her narrator's flights of fancy while she was out on her daily walk. When her first draft was completed, she edited and rewrote some of her pages in 20 function of her initial scheme, deleting, for example, passages which were taken as having recourse to more traditional plot development and explanatory and descriptive devices. 23 Although not everyone agrees about the merits of her results, it is fairly uncontroversial to recognize Jacob's Room as an important modernist work, and it is clear that it was a major breakthrough for Woolf in that it pointed the way towards such masterpieces as Orlando, To the Lighthouse, and The Waves.
To sum up, I have not suggested that episodes of creative artistry are reducible to, or can be fully reconstructed as sequences of rational choice, if by this is meant the deliberate singling out of an option expected to maximize some function. In the case of Virginia Woolf, the scheme she settles on before she begins writing Jacob's Room is indeed a highly schematic notion about a kind of work that she wants to create, a "path" and not a definite result or destination. This scheme is, however, sufficiently particularized in her mind to have both a generative and evaluative function: Woolf is in a position to assess her own results, and subsequent readers can follow her at least part of the way in this regard. It would appear, then, that strategies of rational problem-solving, including planning and pre-commitments, are an important part of the story of artistic creation and reception. These strategies are functionally related even to those aspects of creativity that seem most suited to an a-rationalist, inspirationist account, namely, the "top speed" work of an "under mind" that is not under the agent's direct control, as well as those moments when valuable new ideas suddenly pop into awareness following a period of incubation. Yet it is not the operation of a universal, formal sensibility that makes such spontaneous, selective responses possible, but an 21 operative aesthetic partly shaped and generated through an artist's contextbound selection of and engagement with a prior scheme or project, which in happy cases is at least partly a product of a moderately rational choice made in function of a range of worthwhile artistic goals.
Objections and Replies
I turn now to a series of objections to these conjectures about creativity and commitment to constraints.
In his probing comments on Elster's proposal, Jerrold Levinson claims that artists are typically free to change their minds and abandon or revise whatever prior commitments they may engage in, in which case there may be no correlative to Ulysses' strategy of self-binding or resolute choice. 24 After all, someone who starts out trying to draft a serious philosophical novel could, if things went wrong, bail out and reclassify the results as an ironic fragment.
To this one may respond that although such cases no doubt obtain, in many at least some of the schemes that motivate and guide subsequent activities are indeed oriented towards the creation of artistically valuable works, given a suitably broad and plausible conception of this kind of value. This moderate thesis is not contradicted by the existence of cases where an artist deliberately makes an artistically less valuable work in order to achieve some other goal, such as the maximization of an expected economic payoff.
Another objection that may come to mind here is that it is viciously circular to propose that creativity is explicable in terms of a prior, creative and rational selection of the constraints corresponding to an aesthetic or to some 23 general artistic project. And indeed it would be hopeless to propose that to be creative at making a particular work, the artist must first be creative in selecting an entire aesthetic, where the latter feat remains a perfect mystery.
However, my proposal is not that all prior constraints and schemes are the products of great creativity. The mistaken thesis would be what Robin
Collingwood called "aesthetic individualism," the idea that the artist is a perfectly self-sufficient individual who creatively generates everything --including the medium, art form, themes, techniques, and genres. 25 Sometimes new artistic constraints are indeed devised, but then the artist relies on a background of traditional artistic conventions and methods, as well as received orientations and norms. 26 Yet deliberate experimentation with seemingly arbitrary constraints is sometimes an important part of the story, and can indeed establish a scheme within which unanticipated yet viable aesthetic discernments become possible. 27 In other cases, the attunement of the requisite sensibility and capacities of discernment is a product of training and experience that are only partly the object of the artist's deliberate selection.
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Department of Philosophy Lingnan University pl@ln.edu.hk of the appropriateness or truth of any constructed formal system. Intuition, or an immediate grasp or awareness of an instance of elegant form or of the hidden geometry, is necessary to both the discovery and demonstration of mathematical truths. In this regard Poincaré suggests that the sentiment of mathematical elegance is nothing but the satisfaction due to some conformity between the solution we wish to discover and the "necessities of our mind." 
